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1. Foundationalism 
Here is the picture classical foundationalism draws of 
empirical justification: Our system of beliefs is structured 
like a pyramid, it consists of a broad foundation of per-
ceptual beliefs, i.e. beliefs reporting the contents of our 
perceptual states, and a superstructure of worldly beliefs, 
i.e. beliefs reporting what is going on in the world around 
us. The beliefs building the foundation, the perceptual 
beliefs, are to be justified noninferentially, by direct appeal 
to our perceptual experiences, while the beliefs in the 
superstructure, beliefs about what is going on in the world 
around us, are to be justified inferentially, i.e. by appeal to 
other beliefs. Ultimately, our worldly beliefs thus rest on 
our perceptual beliefs, which in turn draw upon our 
perceptual experiences. 
Now, according to a widespread view, this picture has 
two serious downsides: firstly, the objection goes, it is a 
mystery how perceptual experiences justify perceptual 
beliefs and, secondly, it is fairly doubtful whether worldly 
beliefs can validly be inferred from perceptual ones. Thus, 
Wilfried Sellars calls the foundationalist picture "The Myth 
of the Given" (Sellars 1956). But what exactly are the 
reasons for Sellars' well-known aversion to foundational-
ism?  
According to Sellars, perceptual states cannot justify 
worldly beliefs for reasons relating to the nature of the 
contents of perceptual states. Notice that the contents of 
perceptual states are either conceptual or nonconceptual. 
No matter what they are, according to Sellars' objection 
they cannot justify our worldly beliefs. Here is why: Sup-
pose that perceptual content is nonconceptual. In this case 
the relation between a perceptual state and a belief is 
obviously not logical or inferential. But if this relation is not 
logical or inferential, then – the argument goes – it cannot 
help in justifying a belief. As a consequence, if perceptual 
states have nonconceptual contents, then – pace the 
foundationalist – they cannot justify perceptual beliefs.  
On the other hand, if the contents of perceptual states 
are conceptual, then they are fallible, for then they can 
misrepresent what they are a representation of. But if 
perceptual states are fallible, then – according to Sellars – 
they cannot justify our worldly beliefs: they are no secure 
foundation.1 Hence, even if we would allow perceptual 
states to justify perceptual beliefs, it would still be a 
mystery how perceptual beliefs could justify worldly beliefs. 
Let me give an example: How could my appeal to my belief 
that it seems to me as if I have hands justify my belief that 
I actually do have hands, if, for all I know, I might be a 
handless brain in a vat? Thus, once we consider sceptical 
scenarios like the vat-scenario, an inference from percep-
tual beliefs to worldly beliefs seems out of the question: 
The foundationalist merely asserts that such inferences 
can justify worldly beliefs, but they actually cannot.  
Let me sum up. According to what I have called the 
widespread view, even though perceptual experiences 
cause our worldly beliefs, nevertheless they are not apt to 
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justify them.2 Hence, the foundationalist is taken to be 
somebody, who gives an adequate description of the 
actual processes leading to worldly beliefs, while crucially 
failing in an epistemological respect: She cannot provide 
an argument to the effect that these processes are trust-
worthy. In a nutshell: the foundationalist owes us a reason 
to trust our senses. 
2. Coherentism 
Coherentism is most straightforwardly characterised by its 
opposition to foundationalism: it dispenses with the notion 
of justification by appeal to perceptual experience and 
takes the view that beliefs can be justified only inferen-
tially. As Davidson (1986, 310) puts it, "[w]hat distin-
guishes a coherence theory is simply the claim that 
nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except 
another belief."  
How can we put more flesh onto the bones of this gen-
eral idea? Fine-tuning aside, according to the coherentist, 
a belief is justified just in case it can be integrated into an 
appropriately structured, coherent and sufficiently compre-
hensive system of beliefs. My belief that I have hands, for 
instance, is justified just because it fits fairly naturally into 
my present system of beliefs, which is – the coherentist 
argues – largely coherent and sufficiently comprehensive. 
No doubt, this idea has some prima facie appeal: a belief's 
cohering with the rest of my beliefs seems to enhance the 
chances of its being true, and why, then, shouldn't we 
regard coherence as justificatory? To use Neurath's 
familiar metaphor, beliefs are justified because they 
mutually support each other just like the planks of a raft.  
Now, there is obviously a great deal to be said about the 
notions of coherence and comprehensiveness at play 
here. However, setting fine-tuning aside once again, one 
of the standard objections to coherentist theories of 
justification can easily be put like this: Justified beliefs are, 
by all accounts, not only true by chance. But since at least 
some beliefs that coherently fit into our belief systems are, 
if true, true by chance only, coherence doesn't have any 
interesting relation to epistemic justification.  
For an illustration of this argument it is worth reconsid-
ering the possible situation in which I am a brain in a vat, 
freshly envatted just yesterday. Now, it is fairly obvious 
that my belief system in that situation is qualitatively 
identical with my belief system in the actual situation: in 
both situations do I believe that I've had scrambled eggs 
for breakfast, that I wanted to become a gym instructor 
when I was little, that Falco was the greatest pop star ever, 
etc. But now notice that if those two belief systems are 
indeed qualitatively identical, then every single belief I 
could possibly have must cohere with both systems to the 
very same degree. Thus, since my belief that I have hands 
coheres pretty well with my actual belief system, it also 
does so with my belief system in the vat-situation. But this 
leads to an unpleasant result for the coherentist: she must 
accept that my belief that I have hands is justified in both 
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situations. As a consequence, at least some of my justified 
beliefs are, if true, true by accident only. Hence, a belief's 
coherently fitting into a belief system does not at all seem 
to have the required positive effects on its epistemic 
status: How can the coherentist affirm that I am justified in 
believing that I have hands, if, for all I know, I could just as 
well be a handless brain in vat?  
3. Contextualism 
According to contextualism about 'justification' the situ-
ational context determines the strength of the epistemic 
position a subject has to be in so as to fall into the exten-
sion of the predicate 'ξ is justified'.3 This view is prima facie 
fairly natural, since epistemic standards are quite obviously 
lower in everyday discourse than they are in scientific 
contexts, for instance. And this is exactly the contextual-
ist's point: somebody's evidence may be sufficient for 
being 'justified'4 in one context, while it may fail to be so in 
another. Thus, contextualism can point to an apparent 
analogy between 'ξ is justified' and other gradable expres-
sions like 'ξ is flat' or 'ξ is empty': just like what counts as 
'flat' or 'empty' may vary from context to context, so what 
counts as 'justified' may vary from context to context. 
Hence, contextualism is the view that contextual factors 
like the speakers' goals, their intentions, expectations and 
the overall purpose of their conversation play a crucial role 
in the evaluation of 'justification'-ascriptions.  
Now, how is this theory about the semantics of 'ξ is 
justified' supposed to help us out of the problems we 
encountered with regard to coherentism and foundational-
ism? Let us construe contextualism about 'justification' as 
follows: Suppose that a subject's belief that p is 'justified' in 
a context C just in case the subject has 'good reasons' for 
believing that p in C. Now, as the adjunct 'in C' suggests, 
what counts as a 'good reason' is itself heavily dependent 
on context. What is the benefit of this analysis of 'justifica-
tion' in terms of 'good reasons'? Obviously, once we have 
accepted such an analysis, we can easily claim that 
perceptual experiences and coherent integrability into a 
belief system count as 'good reasons' for worldly beliefs in 
some contexts, while they fail to do so in others.  
Let me give an example. I have perceptual experiences 
as of myself having hands. In an everyday context these 
experiences obviously count as 'good reasons' for my 
belief that I have hands, for they suffice to exclude those 
alternatives to my having hands that are relevant in 
everyday contexts: they suffice, for instance, to rule out 
that my hands were amputated, that I have lost them in a 
car accident, that I am a Thalidomide victim, etc. However, 
if you are a good story-teller, then you can easily generate 
a context in which my perceptual experiences no longer 
count as 'good reasons' for my belief that I have hands. In 
particular, if you can tell stories about handless brains in 
vats as colourful as Daniel Dennett (Dennett 1982) can, 
then I might pretty soon find myself in a context, in which 
my perceptual experiences as of myself having hands are 
not worth a penny with regard to my belief that I have  
 
                                                     
3 See Cohen 1988 for a standard exposition of contextualism. 
4 For the sake of convenience I use scare quotes so as to indicate metalingu-
istic usage: instead of awkward formulations such as 'x falls into the extension 
of the predicate 'ξ is justified' in context C' or 'x satisfies the predicate 'ξ is 
justified' in C' I simply use expressions such as 'x is 'justified' in C'. 
hands. Thus, the foundationalist's view that experiences 
can 'justify' worldly beliefs is actually true in a great deal of 
contexts, even though it fails to be true in contexts with 
extraordinarily high standards.  
What about coherentism? Obviously, the contextualist 
can say pretty much the same about coherent integrability 
into belief systems as I have just said about perceptual 
experience: There are contexts in which the fact that a 
belief coherently fits into a belief system counts as a 'good 
reason' for that belief. But again, there are contexts in 
which this is not so: If you or Dan Dennett tell stories about 
brains in vats, coherence with my background beliefs will 
no longer provide 'good reasons' for a pretty large range of 
my worldly beliefs.  
Thus, according to contextualism, the question 'Can 
perceptual experience or coherent integrability into a belief 
system justify worldly beliefs?' is meaningful relative to a 
particular conversational context only. If we do not provide 
enough information about the beliefs, desires and conver-
sational goals of the participants of some particular 
conversation, the question will simply fail to express a 
complete proposition. And how could we epistemologists 
answer such a question?  
Moreover, note that contextualism has a neat explana-
tion of why foundationalism and coherentism seem 
implausible to many philosophers: The epistemic stan-
dards prevalent in the contexts of philosophical discus-
sions are typically exceedingly high. Indeed, they are 
typically so high that almost nothing counts as a 'good 
reason' in such a context. As a consequence, it is no 
wonder that philosophers insensitive to the context-
sensitivity of 'ξ is justified' doubt the merits of foundation-
alism and coherentism. From a contextualist point of view, 
however, these doubts are not to be taken seriously. Quite 
to the contrary, once we take into account the context-
sensitivity of 'ξ is justified', the problems of coherentism 
and foundationalism, and also the controversy between 
these two theories, can easily be resolved.5  
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